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The Right of Reply in a European Comparative Perspective
Abstract. The purpose of the present paper is to identify the legal position and role of the right of reply within the 
European concept of media law. We wish to fi nd an answer to the question whether the right of reply constitutes a 
limitation to the freedom of the press or if it is to be understood as a means of exercising freedom of opinion (or 
both, perhaps). We shall also try to identify the common foundations of the regulation of the right of reply and its 
general, or at least, most common, manifestations in Europe. According to our preliminary hypothesis, the right of 
reply is a legal instrument serving both the person whose (personality) rights have been violated (the applicant in 
the legal procedure) and the public wishing to access a wide variety of information via the media. The conclusions 
of the paper shall confi rm or refute this hypothesis.
Keywords: right of reply, right of rectifi cation, defamation law, libel law, comparative media law
1. Issues of terminology, clarifi cation of concepts
In a certain sense, the expression “right of reply” is misleading. There are several different 
rights entitling the victims of libel and defamation to assert their rights against the media 
and obliging the latter to publish a reply. These may be called right of reply or right of 
rectifi cation. The difference is between the scope of the rights and the possible extent of the 
content of the reply statement. The right of rectifi cation or correction usually provides for a 
brief correction of false or inaccurate statements, i.e. it does not enable the publication of 
any content other than this; the statement calls, in offi cial and bland terms, the attention of 
the public to the falsehood of the published facts and indicates what the actual state of 
affairs is. In comparison, the right of reply allows the injured party to present their position 
in a comprehensive manner in respect of the disputed issue; i.e. it is not limited to the 
rectifi cation of false information. The right of reply becomes even broader if it is applicable 
against injurious statements of opinion. At the same time, these two “basic models” are 
strongly simplifi ed, since there are no two wholly identical regulatory frameworks in 
Europe, and several states apply a combination of the two models (either by differentiating 
between the regulation of press products and media services or by admitting several 
different forms of reply). That is, the best we can do is to use the term “right of reply” as a 
collective concept encompassing all legal solutions that serve a similar purpose. (Hereinafter 
we shall use the term in this sense.)
Furthermore, we should also mention the rule of retraction, which exists in several 
states of the United States and is somewhat akin to the right of reply. On the basis of the 
provisions governing retraction, a person about whom false and injurious statements have 
been published in the media may demand the correction of these. If this is appropriately 
performed, the injured party’s right to sue for libel is usually waived or the amount of 
damages claimable is decreased signifi cantly (e.g. it is limited to “actual damages” or 
“special damages”, as in the case of the legislation of California and Iowa). In most states 
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where retraction exists, the submission of the application for correction and its rejection or 
inappropriate performance by the media is a precondition to the subsequent initiation of 
court action.1 That is, retraction is closely related to the right of reply, but with the not 
negligible difference that the former does not generate, in any way, a direct possibility for 
the injured parties to “have their say” in the media.
2. International context
I. The European Union
In respect of television service providers domiciled in the European Union, the community 
directive2 has prescribed since 1989 that the legal system of the member states must provide 
the right of reply to the victims of defamatory statements. This does not necessarily mean 
that it is mandatory for all member states to provide for the right of reply: according to the 
text of the directive, a “legal remedy equivalent” to the right of reply is suffi cient as well. 
Since, in the majority of the member states, some sort of right of reply has been in existence 
for a long time, while others apply instruments serving similar purposes (even in the fi eld of 
co- and self-regulation), the adoption of this provision of the Directive has not caused any 
problems.
It is important to stress that the Directive only demands that member states ensure the 
right of reply against false statements; the violation of good reputation and honour by 
statements of opinion does not fall under its scope. However, as the Directive only contains 
the necessary minimum provisions, the member states may apply within their own legal 
systems stricter provisions and may extend the right of reply over injurious statements of 
opinion, too (actually most member states did extend the scope of the right). 
Paragraph (3) of the Directive covers procedural issues while paragraph (4) concerns 
cases when reply may be refused in rather general terms. Paragraph (5) is important because 
it prescribes that, with regard to disputes concerning the right of reply, legal remedy by a 
court of law must be provided (if in a member state the decision of a court of law is required 
in respect of the exercise of the right of reply in the fi rst instance, then it is mandatory for 
the state to provide legal remedy against the fi rst court decision).3
1 Media Libel Law 2011–12. Reports from all Fifty States, the Federal Courts of Appeals, U.S. 
Territories, Canada and England. Edited by the Media Law Resource Center, Inc. Oxford University 
Press, 2011; Fleming, J.: Retraction and Reply: Alternative Remedies for Defamation. University of 
British Columbia Law Review, 12 (1978) 1, 15.
2 Directive 89/552/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the coordination of 
certain provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning 
the pursuit of television broadcasting activities (hereinafter: the Television Without Frontiers 
Directive) and, since 2010, Directive 2010/13/EU on the coordination of certain provisions laid down 
by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States concerning the provision of audiovisual 
media services (Audiovisual Media Services Directive, the AVMS Directive).
3 Castendyk, O.–Dommering, E.–Scheuer, A. (eds): European Media Law. The Hague–London–
Boston, 2008. 733–758.
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Without putting the burden of legal regulation on them, the European Parliament and 
the Council recommended to the Member States the establishment of the right of reply with 
a signifi cantly broader scope than the Directive and supported its introduction in respect of 
online content provision as well as television services.4
II. Documents of the Council of Europe  
The fi rst document of the Council of Europe concerning the subject was a 1974 decision, 
one of the fi rst documents concerning the freedom of the press prepared within the 
framework of the legal development and standard-setting activities of the international 
organisation. The decision states that the freedom of the press involves obligations and 
responsibilities, too, and that the interest of the community is to access information from 
diverse sources. Accordingly, the member states are required to ensure the right of reply of 
injured individuals against injurious statements of facts and opinions. As such, while the 
right belongs to the injured individual, it also serves the community striving to access 
information.5
The 2004 recommendation of the Council of Ministers expressed that it would be 
desirable to extend the right of reply over the online environment as well. The 
recommendation also stresses that access to information from a variety of sources is in the 
interest of the community but, in comparison with the previous decision, it limits the 
desirable object of the right of reply and only requires its implementation in the various 
legal systems in respect of false or inaccurate statements of fact.6
The European Convention on Transfrontier Television provides for the right of reply in 
a manner similar to that of the EU Directive.7
III. The case law of the European Court of Human Rights
In the case Ediciones Tiempo S. A. v. Spain (app. no. 13010/87, decision of 12 July 1989) 
the European Court of Human Rights rejected the application. The complainant press 
publisher sought remedy from the Court after having been ordered by the Spanish courts to 
publish a reply. According to the complainant this involved the publication of information 
known to be false by the complainant, which violated the complainant’s freedom to publish 
information and the freedom of the press. In its decision, the Court established that the right 
of reply is an instrument serving the public’s right to information; on the basis of the Court’s 
decision its role of protecting the personality of the injured party is secondary to this. The 
public’s right to information from diverse sources and the circumstance that the reply has to 
be published within a short time from the original publication make it unnecessary and 
impossible to examine the truth of the content of the reply.
4 Recommendation of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 December 2006 on the 
protection of minors and human dignity and on the right of reply in relation to the competitiveness of 
the European audiovisual and on-line information services industry (2006/952/EC).
5 Council of Europe Committee of Ministers Resolution (74) 26 on the Right of Reply–Position 
of the Individual in Relation to the Press (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 2 July 1974, at 
the 233rd meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
6 Recommendation Rec(2004)16 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the right of 
reply in the new media environment (Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 15 December 2004 
at the 909th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies).
7 European Convention on Transfrontier Television, Strasbourg, 5. V. 1989., art. 8.
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In the case Melnychuk v. Ukraine (app. no. 28743/03, decision of 5 July 2005) the 
European Court of Human Rights went even further and established that the right of reply 
is part of the freedom of speech of the complainant. That is, rather than limiting the freedom 
of the press of the publisher of the paper carrying the injurious content, the opposite is true: 
the right is an instrument that enables the complainant to effectively exercise the freedom 
of speech in the forum where the complainant has been attacked. The task of the state is to 
ensure this possibility. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the complaint could not be 
accepted because the content of the statement the complainant wished to have published 
went beyond the admissible limit, i.e. the content of the original publication. (The Court 
used the same argumentation in the case Vitrenko and others v. Ukraine [app. no. 23510/02, 
decision of 16 December 2008].) 
The case Kaperzynski v. Poland [app. no. 43206/07., decision of 3 April 2012] 
concerned a journalist’s criminal conviction for failing to publish a reply to a defaming 
article. The journalist was sentenced to 20 hours community service per month (for 4 
months, but suspended) and deprived him of the right to work as a journalist for 2 years. 
The Strasbourg Court found that the applied sanctions were disproportionate, and therefore 
had not been necessary in a democratic society, so the state violated the applicant’s right to 
free speech. The Court argued that a criminal measure as a response to defamation cannot, 
as such, be considered disproportionate, but also considered that the relevant sections of the 
Polish Press Act had subsequently been found unconstitutional by the Polish Constitutional 
Court.
As regards the right of reply, the Court reinforced its earlier rulings: “The Court is of 
the view that a legal obligation to publish a rectifi cation or a reply may be seen as a normal 
element of the legal framework governing the exercise of the freedom of expression by the 
print media. It cannot, as such, be regarded as excessive or unreasonable. Indeed, the Court 
has already held that the right of reply, as an important element of freedom of expression, 
falls within the scope of Article 10 of the Convention. This fl ows from the need not only to 
be able to contest untruthful information, but also to ensure a plurality of opinions, 
especially on matters of general interest such as literary and political debate…” (para. 66).8
3. Comparative overview of certain issues related to the right of reply9
I. The nature of the source of law governing the institution
Although it has no direct bearing on the content and limitations of the right, it is nevertheless 
important to know which and what type of source of the law governs the right of reply in 
the various states. In those states where the issue is managed via the instruments of state 
regulation, the institution is usually provided for by law (most often the special sectoral law 
dealing with the media), although in several countries this right has gained constitutional 
8 For the overview of relevant ECHR case law, see: Björgvinsson, D. T.: The Right of Reply. In: 
Casadevall, J.–Myjer, E.–O’Boyle, M.–Austin, A. (eds): Freedom of Expression. Essays in Honour of 
Nicolas Bratza. Oisterwijk (the Netherlands), 2012. 170−174.
9 During the overview of the various national regulations we have relied, to a great extent, on 
the fi ndings of the international study conducted by DLA Piper Hungary on behalf of the National 
Media and Infocommunications Authority in 2011–12. The study was conducted on the basis of the 
legal provisions effective on 31st March 2012. The author received information after that date 
concerning the development of the regulation in Poland, and is grateful to Beata Klimkiewicz for that.
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rank. The signifi cance of this is immense, since in these countries the right of reply has 
become a constitutional (fundamental) right is on a par with the fundamental right of the 
freedom of the press. In these instances, therefore, it is obvious that in principle the right of 
reply entails an admissible limitation of the freedom of the press. 
At the same time, this inference is also possible via legal interpretation rather than 
constitutional codifi cation. This is what the European Court of Human Rights did when it 
established that the right of reply is an essential element of the freedom of speech and the 
freedom of the press of the party intending to publish the reply and therefore, if disputes 
arise in the context of this right, the point of reference for both sides will be the exercise of 
press freedom and the freedom of speech (it being the freedom of the media on the one side 
and the freedom of the person initiating the publication of the reply on the other). 
From the member states of the European Union, one can fi nd the right of reply in the 
constitutions of Greece, Portugal and Slovenia.
According to article 14 par. 5 of the Greek Constitution, “Every person offended by an 
inaccurate publication or broadcast has the right to reply, and the information medium has a 
corresponding obligation for full and immediate redress. Every person offended by an 
insulting or defamatory publication or broadcast has also the right to reply, and the 
information medium has a corresponding obligation to immediately publish or transmit the 
reply. The manner in which the right to reply is exercised and in which full and immediate 
redress is assured or publication and transmission of the reply is made, shall be specifi ed 
by law.”
The right of reply and rectifi cation is a fundamental right set forth in article 37 no 4 of 
the Portuguese Constitution. Pursuant the referred article, “Every natural and legal person 
shall be equally and effectively ensured the right of reply and to make corrections, as well 
as the right to compensation for damages suffered...” (The right of reply and the right to 
indemnifi cation are related to the freedom of opinion and the freedom of the press discussed 
in the fi rst three paragraphs of art. 37.)
Article 40 of the Slovenian constitution declares that “The right to correct published 
information which has damaged a right or interest of an individual, organization or body 
shall be guaranteed, as shall be the right to reply to such published information.”
All three constitutional provisions make a distinction between and mention separately 
the (broader) right of reply and the (narrower) right of correction. The fact that both the 
Greek and the Portuguese legal systems regulate the right of reply in the broad sense and 
provide for the publication of reply statements in the case of the publication of injurious 
opinions, too, is related to this characteristic. On the other hand, the Slovenian media 
regulations provide for the right of reply only in the event of the publication of false 
statements of fact, even though the constitution names the right of correction and the right 
of reply separately.
From those European countries that are not members of the Union, Croatia,10 
Macedonia,11 Turkey12 and the Ukraine13 have elevated the right of reply to the rank of 
fundamental right. The signifi cance of this is mainly symbolic, since the actual assertion of 
the right does not have a clear and close connection with the nature of the source of law 
10 Constitution of Croatia, art. 38 (4).
11 Constitution of Macedonia, art. 16.
12 Constitution of Turkey, pt. 2, ch. 2, § XI, art. 32.
13 Constitution of Ukraine, art. 32.
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governing it and its position within the hierarchy of the sources of the law. The constitutional 
nature of the right does not entail that it may limit the freedom of the press and vice versa: 
the limitation of the latter may be admissible even if the right of reply is not part of the 
constitution.
There are European States where the right of reply is provided for by the general civil 
code. Such, for example, is the Dutch right of reply, which is the right of correction or 
rectifi cation in the narrow sense.14 (Between 1977 and 2010, the Hungarian regulation 
applied a similar solution, too.)
Within the European Union there are very few states where the law provides for no 
right of reply or right of rectifi cation. One such is the United Kingdom, the other is Sweden. 
In the case of the latter, however, the contract between the media service providers 
authorised to use frequencies and the media authority may prescribe the obligation to 
publish replies, which can therefore become a legal obligation without any act of law.15 In 
practice all media services using state-owned frequencies are obliged by contract to publish 
replies. In Sweden the actors of the media market settle the issue of the right of reply 
between themselves within the framework of self-regulation.16 Bulgaria applies a unique 
solution: while the media service regulations do provide for the right of reply, in the case of 
press products it is subject only to self-regulation.17
Another solution used is that the general provisions of legal acts are expounded in a 
code–typically prepared by the media authority–which defi nes the detailed rules. For 
example, this solution is applied by the Romanian media regulations.18
The prescription of the right of reply (either uniformly, in a single legal act for all 
media or in several legal acts in a differentiated manner for the various types of media) is 
common to the media regulations of EU member states.
II. The material scope of the regulation
Two questions arise in respect of the material scope of the regulation of the right of reply by 
the state. The fi rst is whether the regulations differentiate between the various types of 
media, i.e. whether they contain different provisions for media services or press products or 
perhaps exempt one of these from the scope of the regulations. The other one is whether, 
during recent years, the regulations have changed and been extended over new media 
content services including, especially, online (textual) content services and on-demand 
media services.
The review of the regulations of the various EU member states shows that most of 
them provide for the right of reply in a uniform manner, i.e. the same norm applies to media 
14 Dutch Civil Code, art. 6–167.
15 Radio and Television Act (Sw. Radio-och tv-lag (2010:696), Ch. 4 s. 9 para. 11.
16 Code of Ethics for Press, Radio and Television, s. 5 and 13.
17 Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism in the Member States–Towards a Risk-
Based Approach. Prepared for the European Commission Directorate-General Information Society 
and Media by K.U. Leuven–ICRI, Jönköping International Business School, MMTC Central European 
University, CMCS Ernst and Young Consultancy Belgium. Leuven, July 2009. (Hereinafter: 
Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism). Country Reports–Bulgaria.
18 Decision no. 187 of April 3, 2006 Concerning the Regulations of the Content of Audiovisual 
Programme Services, art. 48.
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services and press products, although it is also true that online services fall under the scope 
of the regulations in only a minority of these states. 
At the same time, Belgium,19 France,20 Latvia,21 Italy22 and Slovakia apply 
differentiated regulations, i.e. in these states separate acts of law provide for the rules 
applicable to the media and to the press, even if there are no signifi cant differences between 
the content of these. 
The Slovakian regulations provide for a much broader right of reply in the case of 
press products (where the publication of the actual reply statement may be demanded) than 
for media services (where only rectifi cation may be demanded).23 On the other hand, the 
Finnish regulations differentiate on the basis of the personal status of the applicant rather 
than the type of the service: if the offended party is a private individual they are granted the 
right of reply, while legal persons or authorities are only granted the right to publish 
rectifi cation.24 
In Ireland an act provides for the right of reply in respect of media services.25 At the 
same time, a “hybrid” solution is applied with regard to press products. The Defamation 
Act of 2009 created the legal basis for the existence of the industry’s already established 
self-regulatory body, the Press Council. The act entrusts this organisation with drawing up 
the rules (the Code of Conduct) applicable to the press. Accordingly, the obligation of the 
publication of reply statements is provided by this Code of Conduct formulated by the Press 
Council.
“Principle 1. Truth and accuracy
1.2. When a signifi cant inaccuracy, misleading statement or distorted report or picture 
has been published, it shall be corrected promptly and with due prominence.”
“1.3. When appropriate, a retraction, apology, clarifi cation, explanation or response 
shall be published promptly and with due prominence.”
On the basis of the Code of Conduct the Press Ombudsman is entitled to proceed and 
investigate complaints. It is mandatory for the press product to publish the condemnatory 
decision if so ordered by the Press Ombudsman.26
The Bulgarian regulation is similar, too. There, an act provides for the right of reply in 
respect of media services, while a self-regulatory code applies to the press; this provides for 
19 Valcke, P.–Lievens, E.: Media Law in Belgium. Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011. 67–68, 105. See 
Federal Act of 23 June 1961 (Loi relative au droit de réponse; on the right of reply in the press); 
concerning the audiovisual media, see the Decree of 27 March 2009 in the Flemish Community, the 
Decree of 27 June 2005 in the German Community, the Act of 23 June 1961 in the French Community.
20 1881 Press Act and Law of 29 July, 1982.
21 1995 Act on Radio and Television, art. 36–37, 1990 Law on the Press and other Mass Media, 
art. 21.
22 Legislative Decree 31 July 2005, no. 177 (Media Code), Section 8 of the Law 8 February 
1948, no. 47 (Printed Press Law).
23 Press Law no. 167/2008, art. 8; Act on Broadcasting and Retransmission, art. 21; Skolkay, A.: 
Media Law in Slovakia. Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011. 89, 139–140.
24 Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, Ch. 3, s. 8–9. 
25 Broadcasting Act 2009 s. 49.
26 Defamation Act 2009, Schedule 2. 9; Carolan, E.–O’Neill, A.: Media Law in Ireland. Dublin–
Haywards Heath, 2010. 495–512.
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the right of reply as well, but only in respect of those actors who accept the code as 
mandatory.27
Several member states of the European Union have extended the scope of the right of 
reply over online press products; such states are Austria.28 Denmark,29 Estonia,30 Finland,31 
France,32 Germany,33 Hungary,34 Luxembourg,35 Poland,36 Portugal37 and Slovenia.38 In 
some of these states this is expressly provided for by law (either specifi cally nominating 
online press products or by applying a defi nition of the “press” that is general enough to 
include contents disseminated via any technology), while in others the interpretation and 
development of the law by the courts has extended the scope of the regulations to the new 
services.
27 Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism op. cit. (n. 16.), Country Reports – 
Bulgaria.
28 In general terms, regulations of the Media Act (Mediengesetz, Federal Act on the Press and 
other Publication Media 12 June 1981, Federal Law Gazette No. 314/1981) addressing printed press 
do also apply to online newspapers and other internet portals (with the exceptions to websites 
containing information that do not go beyond the presentation of the personal sphere of life or the 
pure presentation of the media owner). According to Art. 1, s. 1. 1. § 5.a. “periodical electronic media” 
means “a media which is electronically a) broadcast (broadcast programme) or b) to be downloaded 
(website) or c) disseminated in comparable makeup at least four times each year (recurrent electronic 
media).”
29 Danish online newspapers/periodicals fall under the scope of the Media Liability Act no. 85 
of 9 February 1998.
30 The Code of Ethics for the Press is applicable to electronic newspapers as well. See 
Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism op. cit. (n. 17.), Country Reports–Estonia.
31 In Finland the term “network publication” includes the online newspapers and news portals 
as well (“Network publication means a set of network messages, arranged into a coherent whole 
comparable to a periodical from material produced or processed by the publisher, and intended to be 
issued regularly”, see Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, s. 2.1.6.).
32 French courts widely admit that the Press Act also applies to online communication. 
33 The electronic press is covered by the German laws as “telemedia with journalistic editorial 
content”, which is regulated by the RStV (Interstate Treaty on Broadcasting). According to art. 54 of 
the RStV Telemedia with journalistic editorial content, where in particular content of periodical 
printed publications in text or pictures is displayed in full or in part, has to observe the accepted 
journalistic principles.
34 Act no. 104 of 2010 (Press Freedom Act) § 1.
35 Act of 8 June 2004 on the Freedom of Expression in Media (Loi du 8 juin 2004 sur la liberté 
d’expression dans les medias) equally applies to internet press. Media is defi ned as any technical 
means, material or immaterial, used for publication. Publication means information made available to 
the public or a category of the public by an editor by means of media.
36 Online newspapers or news portals are subject to the general provisions laid down in the 
Press Act if they fall within the defi nition of “press” set out in the Press Act of 26 June 1984.
37 Although there is no express rule which establishes the application of the Printed Press Law 
(Law no. 2/99 of 13 January as amended by Law no. 18/2003 of 11 July) to internet press, the rules 
regarding printed press may also apply to online newspapers and to all internet content which include 
journalistic material.
38 The provisions of the Media Act (Offi cial gazette of the Republic of Slovenia (Uradni list RS 
No. 35/2001) generally do not exclusively refer to specifi c kinds of media, so it applies to publications 
on the internet as well.
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III.  Is the application of the right of reply limited to statements of facts 
or does it extend over statements of opinion, too?
As we have seen, the regulations of the European Union and the recommendations of the 
EU and the Council of Europe fi nd it suffi cient if the various legal systems provide for the 
right of reply in respect of false statements of fact. Therefore, several member states of the 
European Union only provide for the right of reply against such statements. At the same 
time, in certain member states the regulation is applicable in respect of injurious statements 
of opinion, too. The Finnish legal system admits the right of reply in the case of “offensive” 
opinions.39 
Under Luxembourgian law anyone who is recognisable or identifi able on the basis of 
the original media content may demand the publication of a reply statement, irrespective of 
whether the information or opinion published about that person was injurious or not. 
“Without prejudice to his other rights, each natural or legal person, each association or 
entity referred to by name or implicitly in a periodical publication has the right to 
request a right of reply free of charge”40
French law admits the right of reply with a similarly broad scope in respect of press 
products, while in the case of media services it allows the exercise of this right if the 
statement of opinion jeopardises honour.41 Under Maltese, Portuguese42 and Greek43 law, 
reply statements may also be published against statements of opinion; in the case of Greece 
this is provided for by the constitution. 
Until 2012, Polish law admitted the right of reply in all media in respect of content 
threatening personality rights.44 Due to the resolution of the Polish Constitutional Tribunal 
(Resolution of the Constitutional Tribunal, 1 December 2010, case fi le: K 41/07), Article 31 
of the Press Act was amended. The Constitutional Tribunal ruled that Article 31 in its 
previous form, is not in harmony with the Polish Constitution, as it did not precisely 
distinguished between “corrections” and “responses”. According to the Constitutional 
Court, the lack of specifi cation what a correction should be, or how a letter of complaint 
should be published, has affected the editors’ decisions on this matter, and was considered 
as an intrusion into media freedom. According to the amended Article 31, now “correction” 
is the only form of the right of reply. It serves to correct incorrect information and facts 
published by the media.
Maltese law incorporates the right of reply against the media with an extremely broad 
scope. The Press Act (Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta), which covers broadcasting as 
39 Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, Ch. 3, s. 8.
40 Act of 8 June 2004 on the Freedom of Expression in Media (Loi du 8 juin 2004 sur la liberté 
d’expression dans les médias), art. 36.
41 1881 Press Act, art. 13. and Law of 29 July 1982, art. 6.
42 Portuguese Constitution, art. 34(4), Press Law (Law no. 2/99 of 13 January as amended by 
Law no. 18/2003 of 11 July) art. 24.
43 Constitution of Greece, art. 14, Law 100/2000 on private audio and audiovisual media, art. 9, 
Law 1730/1987 on public radio and television, art. 3 paras 12–14, Law 1092/1938 on print media, art. 
37–38. See more in Independent Study on Indicators for Media Pluralism op. cit. (n. 17.), Country 
Reports–Greece.
44 Press Act of 26 June 1984, art. 31.
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well, deals with the right of reply in Article 21. It refers to persons “whose actions or 
intentions have been misrepresented or who have been subjected to an attack on their 
honour, dignity or reputation, or to an intrusion into their private life by means of or in a 
newspaper or in any broadcast…”
In these states the right of reply in respect of statements of opinion is generally 
admitted in the case of both media services and press products. 
As opposed to this, in Latvia45 and Bulgaria46 such a right only exists in respect of 
media services, while in Sweden it may only be instituted on the basis of the contract 
between the linear media service providers and the media authority.47 In Belgium and Italy 
the publication of replies to statements of opinion may only be demanded from press 
products; in the former anyone who is recognisable or identifi able from an article may 
demand this (irrespective of whether the opinion published is injurious or not),48 while in 
the latter country the publication of a reply may be demanded by persons whose honour and 
dignity is jeopardised by the given statement of opinion.49 In Ireland, a special solution is 
applied: the press ombudsman may oblige the publishers of press products to publish replies 
to injurious opinions.50
Without exception, all states that recognise the institution of the right of reply permit 
its exercise in the event of false statements of fact being published. At the same time, the 
regulations of the various states differ in whether the scope of the right extends over false 
statements of fact that result in no injury (of personality rights), i.e. whether any (not 
necessarily injurious) false statement of fact may form the basis for the exercise of the right 
of reply or whether it is limited to false statements of fact that are infringing personality 
rights (defamatory or jeopardising honour). 
The latter solution is used more often, nevertheless the legal systems of Luxembourg51 
and the Hungary52 opted to apply the former, i.e. in these states any false facts concerning 
the applicant form the basis of the exercise of the right of reply with regard to both media 
services and press products. France,53 Italy54 and Belgium55 opted for this regulatory 
solution, too, albeit only for press products.
Furthermore, it is an important procedural law issue whether the exercise of the right 
of reply requires the demonstration of the falsehood of the original statement and the 
veracity of the content of the reply during the course of the procedure. Under Austrian56 
law, the reply may only be published if its veracity is demonstrable. According to the 
45 Radio and Television Act (1995) art. 37. See Independent Study on Indicators for Media 
Pluralism op. cit. (n. 17.), Country Reports–Latvia.
46 Law on Radio and Television, Prom. SG. 138/24 Nov 1998, art. 18.
47 Radio and Television Act (Sw. Radio- och tv-lag (2010:696), Ch. 4 s. 9 para. 11.
48 Federal Act of 23 June 1961 (Loi relative au droit de réponse), art. 1.
49 S. 8 of the Law 8 February 1948, no. 47 (Printed Press Law).
50 Defamation Act 2009. Schedule 2. 9; Carolan–O’Neill: op. cit. (n. 26).
51 Act of 8 June 2004 on the Freedom of Expression in Media (Loi du 8 juin 2004 sur la liberté 
d’expression dans les médias), art. 36.
52 Act 104 of 2010 (Press Freedom Act) § 12.
53 1881 Press Act, art. 12–13.
54 S. 8 of the Law 8 February 1948, no. 47 (Printed Press Law).
55 Federal Act of 23 June 1961 (Loi relative au droit de réponse), art. 1.
56 Mediengesetz, Federal Act on the Press and other Publication Media 12 June 1981, art. 1. s. 
1. § 9 (1)–(2).
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relevant Hungarian procedural rule, the veracity of the statements of the applicant is to be 
assumed; however, if the publisher of the injurious statement is able to refute the veracity of 
the contents of the reply statement “immediately” (at the beginning of the procedure, by the 
fi rst trial date), then the publisher is relieved from the publication duty.57 The provisions of 
the Danish58 and Latvian59 laws are similar, too.
According to the special solution of Portuguese law, if, after publication, it is found 
that a fact stated in the reply or correction published in the press product was false, then the 
author of the reply is required to pay the price of the “space” used by the reply (as if the 
author had purchased advertising space). This rule also applies if the length of the reply 
statement exceeds the maximum provided for by law (300 words or the length of the 
original statement if that was in excess of 300 words); in such a case the press is required to 
publish the reply in its entirety, but the publication of the excess content must be paid for by 
the party exercising the right of reply.60 Another rule specifi c to Portugal which creates a 
special kind of right of reply is that the opposition parties of parliament may refute the 
political position statements of the government published in public service media that have 
direct bearing on the opposition parties.61
IV. The cases of relief from liability
Relief from the duty of the publication of the reply statement is only possible if one or more 
of the causes defi ned by the regulation exist. It is a fundamental principle that the reply 
statement must conform to certain criteria. Typically, these concern the language and 
maximum length of the reply. It is also important that the reply statement itself may not be 
in breach of the law (e.g. slanderous or defamatory) and that its content must pertain to the 
content of the original statement. The Cypriot62 and the Luxembourg63 regulations provide 
that the content of the reply may not offend “public morals” (in the case of the former, this 
provision only applies to linear media services). Besides this, strict procedural rules apply 
to the manner of the vindication of the right, e.g. in respect of the time limit of handover. 
If, however, the applicant observes the content and procedural requirements of the 
statement, the obligor typically may not deny the publication of the reply. That is, in most 
countries the obligor’s responsibility is objective without the possibility of freeing them 
from blame. There are a few exceptions to this that allow relief from liability within a 
limited scope. 
57 Paragraph (2) of Article 342 of Act III of 1952, On the Code of Civil Procedure.
58 Media Liability Act no. 85 of 9 February 1998, s. 36. (“Requests for reply in the mass media 
to information of a factual nature which might cause anyone signifi cant fi nancial or other damage, and 
which has been published in a mass media, must be heeded, except where the correctness of the 
information is unquestionable.”). See Sandfeld Jakobsen, S.–Schaumburg-Müller, S.: Media Law in 
Denmark. Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011. 91–92.
59 Radio and Television Act (1995), § 36 (3); Szalai, A.–Szőke, G. L.: A média szabályozása 
Észtországban, Lettországban és Litvániában (The regulation of the media in Estonia, Latvia and 
Lithuania). Budapest, 2010. 39. 
60 Press Law (Law no. 2/99 of 13 January as amended by Law no. 18/2003 of 11 July), art. 25–26.
61 Law no 27/2007 of July 30 (Television and On-Demand Audiovisual Services Law), art. 64 
(1) and the Law no 54/2010 of December 24 (Radio Law), art. 57 (1).
62 Radio and Television Stations Law of 1998, art. 44.
63 Act of 8 June 2004 on the Freedom of Expression in Media (Loi du 8 juin 2004 sur la liberté 
d’expression dans les médias), art. 41 para. a).
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In certain states, relief from liability is possible in respect of the publication of 
statements and opinions (dissemination) originating from third parties. According to the 
justifi cation of this reason for freeing the publisher from blame, alleged information does 
not originate from the medium publishing it, and, since it is the duty of the medium to 
present the various relevant positions, it cannot be held liable for performing this duty. This 
concept, however, is only professed by the legal system of a few states, since none of the 
arguments in favour of the existence of the right of reply would be affected by the fact that 
the statement forming the basis of the reply did not originate from the medium or journalist 
publishing it: this has no bearing on the injury of personality rights and the publication of 
the reply serves the information of the public in this case, too. 
In the Czech Republic, a radio and television broadcaster shall not be obliged to 
transmit a reply if “the challe nged communication or part thereof is quoted from a third 
party’s communication intended for the public, or is a true interpretation thereof, and was 
marked or presented as such.”64
In Malta, the right of reply in the press shall not apply to any privileged publications 
(in cases where no action lies under that article in respect of such publication). 
Under Article 33 of the Press Act (Chapter 248 of the Laws of Malta), the following 
are the “privileged publications”: 
“(a) publications made in pursuance of an Act of Parliament or by authority of the 
President of Malta or of the House of Representatives; 
(b) publications consisting of communications between public offi cers, or between 
such offi cers and contractors of the public service or offi cials of public corporations, 
reports of inquiries held in terms of any law, or statements by public offi cers that are 
made in good faith in the interests of national security, territorial integrity, public 
safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime or for the protection of health or morals; 
(c) publications of bona fi de reports of debates of the House of Representatives, 
provided the relevant part of the debate is published, and the defence of any person 
against whom any charge is made is not suppressed or maliciously or negligently 
curtailed or altered; 
(d) publications of reports of any proceedings in a court of justice in Malta, provided 
such reports are fair reports of the proceedings and the publication of such reports or 
proceedings is not prohibited by law or by the court:
Provided that it shall not be lawful to publish (a) anything which, by article 994 of the 
Code of Organization and Civil Procedure, is forbidden to be used or produced, or (b) 
any report of the proceedings in any case of defamation, in which evidence of the truth 
of the matters charged is not allowed by law.”
In Slovakia, under the press law, a public offi cial, a chairman of a political party or 
political movement, a vice-chairman of a political party or political movement or a legal 
entity represented by these persons does not have the right of reply in relation to a statement 
of fact concerning the exercise of their function.65
64  Act no. 231/2001 Coll. [Radio and Television Broadcasting Act art. 40 c)], Act. no 46/2000 
Coll. (Press Act) s. 10–15.
65  Act No. 167/2008 Coll. on Periodicals and Agency News Service, § 8 (2). Markechova, J.: 
Slovakia–Amendment to the Press Act. IRIS 2011-8:1/43 http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2011/8/
article43.en.html.
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According to the Act, the publisher of a periodical and a press agency shall not be 
responsible for “the content of information provided by a public authority, a budgetary 
organisation or grant-funded organisation established by them or a legal entity established 
by law, if this information is published in the periodical or agency news service in its 
original form and its processing for publication has not changed its original content...”66
In Austria, there is no obligation to publish a counterstatement or subsequent 
information if it refers to a true report on a hearing in a public session of the National 
Council, the Federal Council, the Federal Assembly, a State Parliament or any committee of 
the above general bodies of representation.
In other cases, the obligation does not exist if the person concerned has been offered 
adequate opportunity to comment in the same or a different but equivalent release and has 
not made use of it or if, before receipt of the counter-statement, an equivalent editorial 
correction or supplement has been published.67
According to the Audiovisual Code of Romania,68 a right of reply cannot be requested 
when licence holders did abide by the principle of “audiatur et altera pars,” when he/she 
did receive an opportunity to respond to any criticism against him/her.
In Iceland, media service providers may reject a request to reply “if the information 
broadcast by the media service provider consists of direct citations of content originating 
from government authorities or courts of law.”69
The case law of Hungarian courts has shifted to a more lenient approach toward 
dissemination (exemption from liability of persons disseminating information), even 
without any statutory changes. On the basis of Supreme Court Decision EBH2001. 407, 
members of the press reporting on proceedings falling within the competence of the 
Parliament, local governments, various national and local public administration bodies and 
the organs of the judiciary “are not required to have evidence for the truthfulness of their 
statements”, and, consequently to publish reply statements. Similarly, the press may not be 
required “to verify the statements made at a press conference by a police offi cer” (BH2002. 
51.), and to publish corrective statements. Similarly, “press correction may not be sought if 
the press publishes correct information about a fact established in a criminal, civil, or public 
administrative action before the completion of the proceedings” (BH2004. 273.), even if the 
information subsequently turns out to be false in the course of the proceedings.
V. The sanctions applicable in the event of infringement of the right of reply
Upon the conclusion of the proceedings of a court or in some states the media authority 
directed at the publication of a reply statement, the obligation of the publication thereof is a 
possible legal sanction in all cases. Under Hungarian law, for example, the obligation to 
publish is the only possible sanction that is applicable upon the conclusion of the 
procedure.70 Under several legal systems, however, the application of a fi ne is also possible 
if it is proved that the given medium unreasonably denied the publication of the reply. 
66 Act No. 167/2008 Coll. on Periodicals and Agency News Service, § 5 (2).
67 Media Act (Mediengesetz), Federal Act on the Press and other Publication Media 12 June 
1981, Federal Law Gazette No. 314 (1981) § 11.
68 Decision no. 187 of 3 April 2006 Concerning the Regulations of the Content of Audiovisual 
Programme Services, art. 48.
69 Media Law No. 38. of 20 April 2011, Art. 36.
70 Act 104 of 2010 (Press Freedom Act) § 12.
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The nature of the fi ne sanction also varies among the different states, according to 
whether it may be imposed by a court or an authority and whether it is imposed as a public 
administrative or criminal law sanction. In certain states the regulations are differentiated in 
this respect, too: in Cyprus, for example, in respect of linear media services it is the media 
authority that may impose fi nes while in the case of press products this may be done by the 
courts.71 Sanctions are also imposed by courts in Belgium,72 Finland,73 Denmark,74 France 
and Poland, generally, i.e. in respect of all media. In France the failure to publish the reply 
statement may also result in up to three months’ imprisonment.75 The maximum term of 
imprisonment is four months in Denmark.76 In Poland, besides fi nes, imprisonment is also 
an admissible punitive measure.77 In Portugal both the courts and the authorities may 
proceed in cases related to the infringement of the right of reply and may apply potentially 
severe fi nes (a maximum of €15,000 for the press and €375,000 for media services).78 In 
Italy the media authority is entitled to proceed in cases related to the right of reply in respect 
of both linear media services and press products and may impose fi nes.79
A special type of sanction is the order to publish the condemnatory judgement or 
decision. In Ireland, this may be done by the media authority in respect of linear media 
services and by the press ombudsman in respect of press products.80
VI. Legal instruments similar to the right of reply
Danish law provides for a special provision that may be considered as an indirect form of 
the right of reply: Section 273 of the Criminal Code provides that the courts may award a 
lump sum to victims of slanderous statements. The winning party may use the amount 
awarded to publish the judgement, i.e. may purchase advertising space or time for the 
presentation of the judgement (since the medium committing slander cannot be obliged to 
publish the reply statement via the criminal proceedings, as such obligation may only be 
imposed on the basis of media regulations).81
71 Radio and Television Stations Law of 1998, Printed Press Law (Law 145/89).
72 Federal Act of 23 June 1961 (Loi relative au droit de réponse), art. 6.
73 Act on the Exercise of Freedom of Expression in Mass Media, Ch. 3, s. 11.
74 Pursuant to the Media Liability Act no. 85 of 9 February 1998, s. 49 the Press Council can 
order the editor of a mass media to publish a verdict from the council without changes. 
75 1881 Press Act, art. 13.
76 If the editor fails to publish the verdict of the court in a right of reply procedure, he/she is 
sanctioned with fi nes and in rare occasions even prison sentence up to 4 months.
77 Press Act of 26 June 1984, art. 46. According to the resolution of the Polish Constitutional 
Tribunal, art. 46 para. 2 was repealed in 2012, but in the case of corrections, the unjustifi ed denial still 
can be punished by imprisonment (under art. 46. para. 1).
78 Press Law (Law no. 2/99 of 13 January as amended by Law no. 18/2003 of 11 July), and 
Section IV of the Chapter V of the Law no. 54/2010 of 24 December (Radio Law) and by the Section 
IV of the Chapter VI of the Law no. 27/2007 of 30 of July, rectifi ed by the Declaration of Rectifi cation 
no. 82/2007 of 21 September and amended by the Law no 8/2011 of 11 April (Television and On-
Demand Audiovisual Services Law).
79 Legislative Decree 31 July 2005, no. 177 (Audiovisual Media and Radio Services Code), 
art. 32-quinquies, paras 3–4; Mastroianni, R.– Arena, A.: Media Law in Italy. Alphen a/d Rijn, 2011. 
77–78.
80 Broadcasting Act 2009, Defamation Act 2009.
81 Sandfeld Jakobsen–Schaumburg-Müller: op. cit. (n. 58.) 91.
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Hungarian law admits the civil law sanction of “public restitution” in the event of 
infringement of personality rights.82 The scope of this sanction is broader than that of press 
correction, since it is applicable to the infringement of any personality right by anyone (in 
practice the courts apply it in cases of defamation and injury to reputation and against 
content published in the media). The specifi c judgements often provide for the obligation of 
restitution. In such cases, the courts specify the place where such restitution has to be 
provided (i.e. the press product in which the statement serving restitution has to be 
published; usually this is the same press product as the one in which the infringement has 
been committed). The question arises how such judgements can be put to effect, since, 
unless the court establishes an infringement on the part of the publisher of the press product, 
the publisher has no obligation to publish the statement of restitution.
Several legal systems differentiate according to the extent of the right of reply and 
provide for a narrower and a broader right of reply (according to general terminology: the 
right of reply and the right of rectifi cation/correction) within the same legal act. This 
solution is applied by French,83 Latvian,84 Portuguese,85 Romanian86 and Slovakian87 law.
4. Conclusions
On the basis of the comparative overview one may formulate some conclusions on the 
nature and regulation of the right of reply in Europe (or, more precisely, in the member 
states of the European Union that form the primary subject of the study). Of course, these 
will not hold true for every single state; however, they do bring to light a specifi c European 
model or the European common core88 of the right of reply, the major aspects of the 
regulations and the directions of their development.
A) Although in certain states the right of reply is a constitutional (fundamental) right, 
it is usually provided for at a lower level of the legal hierarchy. At the same time, the form 
does not necessarily determine the actual possibility of the exercise of the right, just as the 
fact of constitutional protection does not determine the hierarchy between the right of reply 
and the freedom of the press.
B) The legal function of the right of reply is twofold: on the one hand, it serves the 
protection of the personality rights (the reputation and/or honour) of the person attacked, 
while, on the other hand, it serves the right of the public audience of the media to appropriate 
information There is no order of precedence or hierarchy between the two functions; the 
right of reply serves both. According to the Slovenian media act (Offi cial gazette of the 
82 Hungarian Civil Code 84. § (1) c).
83 1881 Press Act, art. 12–13.
84 Radio and Television Act (1995) art. 36–37.
85 Press Law (Law no. 2/99 of January 13 as amended by Law no. 18/2003 of July 11), Law no 
27/2007 of July 30 (Television and On-Demand Audiovisual Services Law), and the Law no 54/2010 
of December 24 (Radio Law).
86 Law no. 504/July 11th, 2002 (Audiovisual law), art. 41. 
87 Press Law no. 167/2008. §§ 7–8.
88 On the concept of common core in comparative law, see: Schlesinger, R. B.: The Common 
Core of Legal Systems: An Emerging Subject of Comparative Study. In: Nadelmann, K.–von 
Meheren, A.–Hazard, J.: XXth Century Comparative and Confl icts Law. Legal Essay in Honour of 
Hessel E. Yntema. Leiden, 1961. 65−79. On the theory of Schlesinger, see: Fekete, B.: A modern 
jogösszehasonlítás paradigmái (The paradigms of modern comparative law). Budapest. 143–146.
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Republic of Slovenia (Uradni list RS, No. 35/2001) s. 42(1), “The right of reply is intended 
in the interest of the public in terms of objective, multilateral, and up-to-date information as 
one of the essential conditions for democratic decision-making in public affairs.”
C) The material scope of the right of reply is continuously growing and is gradually 
starting to cover online media, too. As yet, this is not a general trend, but European-level 
legislation and the recommended best practices, as well as the practices and regulatory 
frameworks of the individual states, are developing in this direction. This has both practical 
and theoretical reasons: the arguments in favour of the institution of the right are the same 
as in the offl ine world, and the publication of replies is technically easier on the internet and 
does not take up any space (transmission time) either. Irrespective of this, in almost all 
states the approach to the material scope of the right is that it extends over both media 
services and printed press products.
D) The obligor of the right of reply usually bears objective responsibility in respect of 
the publication of the reply, i.e. relatively few states provide relief from legal responsibility 
if, as a precondition to the exercise of the right of reply, the injurious content generating the 
reply has been published.
E) There are few limitations to the enforcement of the right of reply, i.e. the publication 
of the reply may solely be denied in exceptional cases. These limitations are typically 
formal or procedural in nature (language, deadline, length, etc.).
F) The extent of the right of reply exhibits considerable variance in the countries 
examined according to whether its application is limited to false statements of fact or 
whether it may be applied in the case of injurious opinions as well. There exists no “general 
European” solution in respect of this issue, although the majority of states provide for the 
right of reply only in respect of statements of fact. Approaches vary in respect of statements 
of fact, too: in certain countries only false and injurious statements may form the basis for 
the procedure directed at the publication of the reply, while in others false (but not 
necessarily injurious) statements form suffi cient grounds for the procedure. 
G) The possible length of the statement of reply (i.e. the maximum length that is 
mandatory to be published) differs in the various states and conforms to the scope of the 
right. That is, a broadly interpreted right of reply enables the publication of statements of 
greater length while, if the right of reply is limited to the right of the correction of false 
statements of fact, the reply statement is briefer and is limited to a presentation of the false 
facts and the true state of affairs.
H) The right of reply regularly appears within the systems of self- and co-regulation 
too; however, it is of great signifi cance whether this is accompanied by state regulation or 
whether the state relinquishes the supervision of this right in its entirety to an independent 
organisation. Some form of the right of reply exists in all member states of the EU, which is 
not independent of the fact that this–partly due to the AVMS Directive–is a member state 
obligation (although it is also true that such regulations typically originate from times prior 
to the adoption of the AVMS Directive).
I) Not surprisingly, the results of this comparative study indicate that each EU member 
state regulates the institution of the right of reply differently. On the basis of the research a 
model of the right of reply can be outlined that may be regarded as a sort of “common 
core”. This does not mean that all elements of the model are present in all EU member 
states. However, regulations of a narrower scope than that of these minimum rules exist in 
few member states (while, at the same time, rules additional to the common minimum are 
present in several states). The identifi cation of the common minimum is not suitable in 
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itself for identifying the best existing solution; the versatility of the regulations and the 
differences between the individual legal systems would hardly make this possible anyway. 
Such a model rule, serving to present the common core, would only be applicable 
towards statements of fact that are false or injurious to reputation or honour in all “traditional 
media”, i.e. in television and radio media services and printed press products. The media 
would bear objective responsibility in respect of the publication of the reply statement, i.e. 
if the applicant did not transgress the legal framework of the exercise of the right, the media 
could not deny the publication of the reply. The sanction applicable to non-publication–
beside the publication of the statement or the condemnatory decision of the court of law or 
authority–is the imposition of a fi ne. Although probably by coincidence only, the Hungarian 
regulations almost fully conform to these criteria (with the exception that the material scope 
of the regulations extend over online press products, too, and that no fi nes or damages are 
applicable as sanctions in correction cases).
